Developing a model in which heterogeneity arises among two groups of fundamentalists that follow gurus, we focus on the dynamic effects of increasing heterogeneity. We show that an increasing degree of heterogeneity leads firstly (i) to insurgence of a pitchfork bifurcation and, secondly (ii) generates, together with a larger reaction to misalignment of both market makers and agents, the appearance of a periodic, or even, chaotic, price fluctuation (trough an homoclinic bifurcation, [1]). JEL: C61, G11, G12, D84
Introduction
In a seminal paper Kirman [2] showed that the choice of one "representative" standard utility maximizing individual "is not simply an analytical convenience […], but is both unjustified and leads to conclusions which are usually misleading and often wrong". A clear demonstration of this statement has been given in the last decade by an increasing number of theoretical works on financial markets. Indeed, in this kind of models, price fluctuations are related with the interactions between agents that stabilize the market (fundamentalists) and those that introduce instability to the system (chartists) ( [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , see [7] for a complete survey]. Moreover, price fluctuations can derive from a switching mechanism that moves agents from fundamentalist and chartist trading rule ( [8] and [9] ): an evolutionary competition generates fluctuations that may be triggered by differences in beliefs and amplified by dynamics between different schemes.
Our main aim is to show how an increasing heterogeneity affects price fluctuations.
Despite the canonical framework, in this paper heterogeneity arise among agents that follow the same trading rule: they are all fundamentalists that perceive a different fundamental value. Particularly, as in [10] our model "involves agents who may use one of a number of predictor which they might obtain from [two] financial gurus" (experts).
Agents can switch from one expert to the other following an adaptive belief system. Mainly, agents' switch is driven by experts' ability, approximated by the distance between fundamental value and price. A switching mechanism, based on square error, is employed: the less the margin of square error, the higher the quota of agents that emulate that expert.
We strongly aware that chartists are an essential figure of the modern financial markets, nonetheless our aim is to stress that heterogeneity -in the fundamental value perceived -may be a key factor in explaining price fluctuations. Recently, De Grauwe and Kaltwasser [11] 1 have analysed the coexistence of different fundamental values in the foreign exchange market. However, their switching mechanism is based on profitability, secondly they have chartists in analysis, moreover they assume that supply and demand are always equal and the former is exogenous. Finally, while they use extensively simulations we have also an analytical approach.
Defining the degree of heterogeneity as the difference between fundamental values we show, mainly, that an increasing degree leads firstly (i) to the insurgence of a pitchfork bifurcation and, secondly (ii) generate, together with a larger reaction to misalignment of both market makers and agents, the appearance of a periodic, or even, chaotic, price fluctuation (trough an homoclinic bifurcation, [1] ). After presenting the model, we will discuss in section three the conditions necessary for existence, the stability of fixed points when there is homogeneity and, in section four, how a positive degree of heterogeneity affects the insurgence of a pitchfork bifurcation and the transition to a homoclinic bifurcation. Finally last section provides brief concluding remarks ad suggestions for further research.
The Model
We assume that there are two gurus that extract independently, from information related to the economic system, two fundamental values. Moreover, they are imitated by other operators, which can switch from one expert to the other. Mainly, experts' ability, approximated by the distance between fundamental value and price, drive the agents' switching process. Market makers mediate in transactions, setting prices in reply to excess demand (supply). We explore a model with two assets ( [9] and [13] ): one risky and one risk free. A perfectly elastic supply and a gross return (R>1) characterize the risk-free asset. Moreover, a price ex-dividend ( t X ) and a (stochastic) dividend process 1 Even, Ferreira et al. [12] , using a variation of the minority game, have analyzed the interaction among speculators who disagree about fundamental prices.
( t y ) represent the key elements of the risky asset. Defining i=1,2 the two experts their wealth is expressed as follows:
where the fundamentalist i purchases at time t shares of risky asset t i q , . Given wealth expectations ( t i E , ) and a constant variance over time ( 
where a is the strictly positive constant risk aversion equal for both investors. Hence the investor i demands an amount t i q , following:
We assume that they have a common expectations on dividends
) and future prices (
). It is worth noting that i F represent the benchmark fundamental values detected by the experts analyzing economic factors. The assumption of common expectations on dividend is restrictive.
However, the qualitative dynamic behaviour of the model is not modified but this assumption 2 . Hence, equation (3) can be rewritten as follows:
is the positive coefficient of reaction for investors, that is negatively related to risk aversion. Given symmetry in the model, for simplicity we assume 2 1 F F ≤ . As in [3] the price of the asset follows a market maker mechanism where out of equilibrium exchanges are possible. Particularly, market makers apply the following rule: 
where β is the positive speed of adjustment and 1 + t w is the proportion of agents that imitate expert 1. This depends on the distance between the fundamentals and t P .
Particularly, agents imitate more the expert whose prediction is closer to t P .
Let t i SE , be the square errors of the two experts:
Using an adaptive rational mechanism, 1 + t w can be defined as a frequency:
that, straightforward algebra, is equal to:
where γ represents, as in [8] and [9] , the agent's transfer speed between the two experts' advice. Similarly to [14] the switching mechanism is based on the accurateness of forecast. However his mechanism is built looking at differences between chartists and fundamentalist. Mainly in his model agents prefer chartist strategy "according to the difference between the squared prediction errors of each strategy". Even the mechanism employed by [15] is based on ability agents' prediction; particularly they assume that the larger deviation of current price from fundamental values the greater is the quota of agents that opt for the chartist's strategy.
In our case the quota of agents that follow expert i depends on the relative distance between the corresponding fundamental value, i F and the current price. However this mechanism is not a clear-cut: when the fundamental value i F is equal to current price, in the next period a share of agents still follow the j expert. This implies that the quota varies from zero to one, with extremes not included.
Substituting (3b), (8) in (4) the following dynamic price equation can be achieved:
represents the degree of heterogeneity. 
Homogeneous Fundamentalists

Proof.
For 0 = ∆F , equation (9) can be re-written as:
which is a linear map. A steady state condition is implied, particularly when (10) with different values of the market maker reaction coefficient, β . Figure 1a and 1b respectively show the case in which there is global stability with monotonic or oscillatory convergence. figure 1c we represents the particular set of parameters that determines a period-two cycle and finally figure 1d reports the divergence to infinity. Therefore, linearity implies a monotonically or oscillatory convergence when both market makers and agents do not overreact to misalignment. Otherwise, a divergence to infinity occurs.
Only if the product of the reaction coefficients is exactly equal one, can there be a regime of two period cycles.
A Positive Degree of Heterogeneity
A richer dynamical behaviour arise when the degree of heterogeneity is strictly positive, 0 > ∆F . Even if, as usual, reaction's coefficients play a central role in determines the chaotic behaviour of the system, they do not affect the existence of steady states.
Indeed, the degree of heterogeneity and the transfer speed will determine a pitchfork bifurcation. 
that can be rewritten as follows:
The LHS crosses the x-axis in 1 Given the following first derivate of map (9): (14) with a low enough degree of heterogeneity and intensity of switching, such as there is a unique steady state, there exists an interval ) , 0
( αβ for which the dynamic map is a contraction, and therefore the steady state is globally stable. Finally, to evaluate the stability properties of the unique steady state we work out the equation (14) (15) mainly we know that M P is stable if (15) lies in the interval (-1, 1) . This is true for Proof. Rewriting equation (14) as
, it is straightforward that for each combination of parameters 
It is worth summing up the route to chaos analysing the effects of an increasing heterogeneity. We reported in Figure 7 the effects of an increasing degree of heterogeneity. We set up parameters as follows 
Conclusion
Heterogeneity in financial markets has been developed in various models which have aided in explaining the intraday financial market dynamics. Unlike canonical models we focus on agents with the same trading rules (i.e. fundamentalists) where heterogeneity depends on different fundamental values, agents can move from expert to the other following a switching mechanism. We show that an increasing degree of heterogeneity leads firstly (i) to insurgence of a pitchfork bifurcation and, secondly (ii) together with a larger reaction to misalignment of both market makers and agents to generate a period doubling. Our simple switch mechanism is based on the distance between current price and fundamental values, a further interesting development would be to analyze the dynamics generated by heterogeneity in the case of profitability based imitative process.
In this paper we show that complex dynamics can also arise if all agents act as fundamentalists that do not agree on the fundamental value. Particularly, market instability and periodic, or even, chaotic price fluctuations can be generated.
Heterogeneity plays a central role in economics (i.e. [16] ) and it is able to explain market dynamics.
Since our switching mechanism is based on the distance between current price and fundamental values, it would be interesting to analyze the dynamics generated by
